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Summary
This report provides information on Mexico’s counter-narcotics efforts during
the first four years of the presidency of Vicente Fox.  Special emphasis is placed on
calendar year 2003, covered by the State Department’s March 2004 report on
international narcotics control, and the first six months of 2004, covered in President
Fox’s September 2004 “State of the Nation” report.  This report will be updated
when warranted by events. 
Share of Traffic.  According to the State Department, an estimated 70 percent
of the U.S.-bound cocaine shipments pass through Mexican territory, a higher
estimate than in past years.  Mexico remains a major source country for heroin,
marijuana, and methamphetamine, and a major center for money laundering
activities.
Control Efforts.  Seizures of cocaine by Mexico in 2003 were up 59% from
2002, but they were down 15% from the average yearly seizures in the previous five
years (1998-2002), according to the State Department’s latest report.  Seizures of
marijuana were up 24% from 2002, as well, and up 33% from the average in the
previous five years.  Seizures of methamphetamine and drug labs increased
significantly in 2003 as compared to 2002 and as compared to the 1998-2002
average.  On the other hand, seizures of opium in 2003 were down 39% from 2002,
and down 30% from the average of the 1998-2002 period.  Seizures of heroin were
down 41% in 2003 compared to 2002, and were down 49% from the previous five
years.  Arrests were up in all categories in 2003, and there were major actions against
leading drug lords.  The Mexican State of the Nation report states that 31,719 people
associated with seven drug organizations were  arrested from December 2000 to June
2004, including 15 cartel leaders, 39 financiers, and 64 lieutenants.  Mexico
extradited 31 persons to the United States in 2003, including 18 Mexican nationals
on drug-related charges.  Eradication of opium and marijuana increased in 2003,  but
with more hectares of cultivation, the potential yield of opium was up 74% over 2002
and up 45% from the previous five years, while the potential yield of marijuana was
up 71% from 2002 and up 76% from the 1998-2002 average.
Cooperative Efforts.  President Bush and President Fox have met many times
and have made the bilateral relationship a top priority, although disagreements over
Iraq created some tension.  In these meetings, the presidents agreed to enhance law
enforcement and counter-narcotics cooperation between the two countries, and this
cooperation was facilitated by the modification of the U.S. drug certification process.
Top officials say that the countries have achieved unprecedented levels of
cooperation, including the sharing of sensitive intelligence and expanded training for
Mexican anti-drug forces.  In the post 9/11/01 period, the countries have expanded
cooperation into overlapping counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism programs.
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1 This report draws upon CRS Report RL31412, Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Efforts under
Fox, December 2000 to April 2003, by K. Larry Storrs. 
2 For details on the certification process and an illustration of the possible consequences of
decertification of Mexico, see  CRS Report RL30080, Mexico and Drug Certification in
1999: Consequences of Decertification, March 4, 1999, by K. Larry Storrs.  For more
general information on U.S.-Mexican relations, including legislation on trade, immigration,
and drug trafficking issues, see CRS Report RL31876, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for the
108th Congress, by K. Larry Storrs.
Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Efforts under
Fox, December 2000 to October 2004
Recent Congressional Interest and Action
Congress has had a longstanding interest in Mexico’s counter-narcotics efforts.1
Beginning with legislation originally  enacted in the mid-1980s, Congress required
the President to certify annually, subject to congressional review, that drug producing
or drug-transit countries had cooperated fully with the United States in drug control
efforts during the previous year to avoid suspension of U.S. aid.2  Mexico was fully
certified in following years, but Congress closely monitored these certifications, and
resolutions of disapproval to reverse the presidential certifications were introduced
in 1996-1999.  Following the election of opposition candidate Vicente Fox as
President of Mexico in July 2000, several Members called for modification of the
certification procedures or exemption of Mexico from the process, but legislative
action was not completed.  President Bush certified Mexico as fully cooperative on
March 1, 2001, and no resolutions of disapproval were introduced in 2001.  
In April and September 2001, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported
out two measures (S. 219 and S. 1401) that would have suspended the certification
requirements for three years, but no final action was taken by Congress on the
measures.  In December 2001, Congress passed the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act for FY2002 (H.R. 2506/P.L. 107-115) that waived the drug
certification requirements for FY2002 for all countries, and instead required the
President to designate only countries that had demonstrably failed to meet
international counter-narcotics obligations.  In September 2002, Congress enacted the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2003 (H.R. 1646/P.L. 107-228) that, in
Section 706, made permanent a requirement that the President designate in mid-
September of each year, before the beginning of the fiscal year, the countries which
have demonstrably failed to meet international counter-narcotics obligations.
Acting under these modified requirements, President Bush has made the
required designations for fiscal years 2002 through 2005, and Mexico has not been
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3 For details on U.S. congressional action and the presidential certifications and
designations, see CRS Report 98-174, Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S.
Congressional Action, 1986-2002; CRS Report RL30892, Drug Certification Requirements
and Congressional Modifications in 2001-2002; and CRS Report RL32038, Drug
Certification/Designation Procedures for Illicit Narcotics Producing and Transit Countries,
by K. Larry Storrs. 
4 See U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics & Law Enforcement
Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports (INCSR), generally issued in
March of each year with coverage of the previous year.  The latest version, issued in March
2004, is available on the Internet at [http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/].
5 See U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Mexico: Country
Profile for 2003, DEA-03047, November 2003, pp. iii, 1-3, also available on the DEA
website at [http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/03047/index.html].
mentioned by U.S. officials, except to say that it has been performing well and is far
from failing to meet international counter-narcotics standards.3  
Estimates of Mexico’s Share of 
Drug Trafficking Activity
According to the Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs, Mexico is the principal transit country for South American
cocaine entering the United States, the leading foreign source of marijuana, and a
principal source of heroin.  It is also a major producing and transit point for
methamphetamine and other synthetic drugs.4  Agency experts agree that Mexico’s
share of illicit traffic in the various areas has remained high over the years, although
there are some variations in the estimates.  The methodology for making the
estimates (whether derived from seizures or some other means) is not regarded as
entirely adequate, and the estimates may be affected by changing trafficking patterns
and demand as much as enforcement efforts. 
With regard to cocaine, the major drug of concern, the State Department’s
INCSR report covering the year 2003 states that “an estimated 70 percent of the U.S.-
bound cocaine shipments pass through [Mexican] territory.”  The Drug Enforcement
Administration’s Country Profile for 2003 for Mexico states that “an estimated 70
percent of all cocaine originating from South America destined for the United States
transits the Mexico-Central America corridor.”5  These estimates appear to be a
higher percentage than reported in previous years.  The INCSR covering 2002 stated
that “approximately 65 percent of cocaine reaching the United States passes through
Mexico and waters off the Pacific and Gulf coasts, “ and the INCSR covering 2001
stated that Mexico was the transit point for  “more than one half of the cocaine sold
in the United States.”  
  
With respect to heroin, the INCSR report covering 2003 states that Mexico
produces less than five percent of the world’s opium poppy, but because of the
geographical proximity to the United States it is “the supplier of some 30 to 40
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6 See testimony of Assistant Customs Commissioner John C. Varrone before the
Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee, March 29, 2001.
7 See Presidency of Mexico, Quarto Informe de Gobierno, Section 3,3,2.  This is the State
of the Nation report, in spoken and written form, that Mexican Presidents deliver to
Congress on September 1st of each year.  It is somewhat equivalent to the U.S. State of the
Union report and address.
percent of the U.S. heroin market — especially in states west of the Mississippi.”
This appears to be a slightly higher estimate than in the past.  The INCSR report
covering 2002 stated simply that geographical proximity to the United States “allows
cultivators and processors [in Mexico] to supply a disproportionately large share of
the U.S. heroin market.”  A U.S. Customs official stated, in March 2001 hearings,
that 14% of the heroin seized in the United States comes from Mexico, while an
independent study indicated that Mexico is the source of 29% of the heroin used in
the United States.6
In other areas, the INCSR covering 2003 reports that Mexico “is by far the
leading foreign source of marijuana consumed in the United States,” and “is also a
major producing and transit point for methamphetamine and other synthetic drugs.”
Moreover, the report says that Mexican drug traffickers have steadily increased
operations in all illicit drug sectors in the United States, and have come to dominate
most of the distribution centers.  Mexico continues to be a major money-laundering
center, in which trafficking organizations exploit Mexican banks and financial
institutions to transfer significant amounts of illicitly obtained currency through the
global financial system.  Favored money laundering methods include the smuggling
of U.S. currency into Mexico and the movement of the funds back into the United
States via couriers, wire transfers, and armored vehicles.
In short, Mexico’s share of illicit traffic has remained high over the years, and
seemed to increase in 2003 in major areas, especially in the supply of cocaine and
heroin to the U.S. market.  Mexico’s role as a base for drug traffickers and as a center
for money-laundering persisted and perhaps increased as well.
Mexico’s Efforts to Control Illicit Drug Activities
The following three tables show State Department estimates of Mexican drug
control efforts in three areas — seizures, arrests, and eradication — from 1998 to
2003.  Supplementary information covering the first six months of 2004 is also
provided as reported in the written version of President Fox’s Fourth Report of the
Government.7  Caution should be exercised in considering the changes in the various
areas as an indication of Mexico’s seriousness in controlling drug trafficking.  The
trends may also be affected by the demand for the drugs, the amount of drugs
produced or available, the sophistication of the drug traffickers, the intelligence and
capabilities of Mexican counter-drug agencies, the effectiveness of reporting and
monitoring methods, the effect of weather conditions on eradication efforts, and
competition from alternative drug suppliers.
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Seizures of Drugs
Turning to Mexican seizures of drugs in 2003, the results portrayed in Table 1,
as reported by the State Department, demonstrate a mixed result compared to 2002,
and compared to the average of the previous five years (1998-2002) that have been
calculated to minimize the effects of annual variations.  The results generally show
negative results in the seizures of cocaine, opium, and heroin, while showing positive
results in the seizures of marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug labs.  More recent
Mexican data for the first six months of 2004 show positive results in the seizures of
opium, heroin, and marijuana.
Table 1. Mexican Seizures of Illicit Narcotics, 1998-2003
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Cocaine (mt) 22.6 33.5 18.3 30.0 12.6 20.0
Opium (kg) 150 800 270 516 310 189
Heroin (kg) 120 258 268 269 282 165
Marijuana (mt) 1,062 1,459 1,619 1,839 1,633 2,019
Methamphetamine (kg) 96 358 555 400 457 652
Illicit Drug Labs 7 17 26 21 13 22
Sources: Data are from the U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March
2004, Part I, pp. 159-168, especially the Table on p. 168, with updated data on illicit drug labs from Mexican
official reports provided by the Department of State.  Seizures are measured in metric tons (mt) and kilograms
(kg).
Seizures of cocaine, which many consider to be the key test, increased
significantly, from 12.6 metric tons in 2002 to 20.0 metric tons in 2003, according
to the State Department.  This is a 59% increase from one year to the next, but the
increase is from what appears to be a particularly bad year.  The result for 2003 was
still a 15% reduction from average seizures of 23.40 metric tons in the previous five
years (1998-2002), and it surpassed only two of the previous five years.  Mexican
data for January-June 2004 show seizures of cocaine at 13.1 metric tons, a 17%
reduction compared to January-June 2003, but a respectable result if projected at the
same rate until the end of 2004. 
Seizures of opium declined from 310 kilograms in 2002 to 189 kilograms in
2003, according to the State Department, a 39% reduction from the previous year,
and a 30% reduction from the average of 409 kilograms in the 1998-2002 period.
This was the lowest level of seizures in the last six years, except for 1998.  Mexican
data for the first six months of 2004 show seizures of 269 kilograms of opium, a 50%
increase compared to the first six months of 2003, and a positive result if projected
to the end of 2004. 
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Seizures of heroin declined 41% from 282 kilograms in 2002 to 165 kilograms
in 2003, as reported by the State Department, and this result was a 49% decline from
the average seizures of 240 kilograms in the 1998-2002 period.  However, Mexican
data for January-June 2004 show seizures of heroin up to 154 kilograms, a 166%
increase compared to January-June 2003, and a result more in keeping with recent
performance, especially when using the much higher Mexican data for 2003.
Seizures of marijuana increased 24% from 1,633 metric tons in 2002 to 2,019
metric tons in 2003, according to the State Department, making the seizures the
largest in the last six years, and  a 33% increase over the average of 1,522 for 1998-
2002.  Mexican data show seizures of marijuana for the first six months of 2004 at
790 metric tons, a 44% increase over the first six months of 2003, but a result that
would be below recent results if projected to the end of the year.
Seizures of methamphetamine increased 43% from 457 kilograms in 2002 to
652 kilograms in 2003, the largest level of seizures in the last six years, and were up
75% compared to the average of 373 kilograms in the previous five years, according
to the State Department.  The Mexican data for 2004 do not contain information on
seizures of methamphetamine.
Seizures of illicit drug labs increased 69% from 13 in 2002 to 22 in 2003, as
reported by the State Department, and seizures were up 34% from the average of 17
labs during the previous five years, on an indicator that is likely to be somewhat
erratic.  Mexican data shows only two illicit drug labs being seized in January-June
2004, an 85% reduction compared to the number of seizures in January-June 2003.
Arrests and Extraditions of Drug Traffickers
Arrests in General.  As indicated in Table 2, the number of people arrested
in Mexico on drug-related charges increased in 2003 in all categories compared to
2002, as reported by the State Department, but the arrests are low compared to the
previous four years and to the average arrests in the 1998-2002 period.  
Table 2. Mexican Arrests on Drug-Related Charges, 1998-2003
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Nationals 10,034 10,261 10,771 9,784 6,930 7,653
Foreigners 255 203 233 189 125 139
Total 10,289 10,464 11,004 9,973 7,055 7,792
Sources: Data are from the U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March
2004, Part I, pp. 159-168, especially the Table on p. 168, with missing data being supplied by the State
Department.
The figures show that the arrests of foreigners in 2003 were up slightly from
2002, but lower than all previous years, about 31% lower than the average of 201 for
the 1998-2002 period.  The number of arrests of Mexicans and the number of total
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arrests were up 10% from 2002 to 2003, but down 20% from the average in the
previous five years.  More recent Mexican data show higher arrest figures for 2003
and total arrests of 5,050 in the first six months of 2004, a 10% increase over the
results in the same period in 2003. 
Actions Against Major Traffickers.  Despite the mixed results on arrests,
recent State Department’s INSCR reports have praised arrest successes against the
major Mexican drug cartels, although the reports have exhibited slightly diminishing
enthusiasm, and new cartels have been emerging to replace those that have been
damaged.8  The report covering 2001 stated that the Mexican government’s
longstanding fight against drug trafficking and crime has “resulted in tangible
successes against the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO), the Carrillo Fuentes
Organization (CFO), and the Gulf Cartel — widely considered the top three drug
groups in the country.”  The report covering 2002 stated that “Mexican authorities
continued to achieve impressive results in arresting leaders of major drug trafficking
organizations, undermining their capabilities to operate both in Mexico and the
United States.”  The report covering 2003 states that “Mexican authorities sustained
an intensive counternarcotics effort  throughout 2003, including the capture of major
drug cartel figures. . . .”  In line with these reports, the Mexican State of the Nation
report states that 31,719 people associated with seven drug organizations were
arrested from December 2000 to June 2004, including 15 cartel leaders, 39 financiers,
and 64 lieutenants.
Major successes against the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) based in
Tijuana near San Diego include the following: (1) the arrest in March 2001 of a cell
leader, Rigoberto Llanez Guerrero, and several lieutenants; (2) the arrest in August
2001 of Colombian trafficker and cocaine supplier Herbert Alberto Cruz Ruiz; (3)
the killing in early February 2002 of drug lord Ramon Arellano Felix in a police
shootout in Mazatlan, although some sources say he was killed by a rival gang; (4)
the arrest in early March 2002 of drug lord and overall leader Benjamin Arellano
Felix; (5) the arrest in mid-March 2002 of Miguel Herrera Barraza, another key
figure in the organization; (6) the arrest in April 2002 of 43 corrupt police officers
protecting the cartel and the subsequent arrest of other cartel lieutenants; and (7) the
arrest in June 2004 of drug kingpins Jorge Arellano Felix and Efrain Perez.
Accomplishments against the Carrillo Fuentes Organization (CFO) based in
Juarez near El Paso include (1) the arrest in May 2001 of former Governor Mario
Villanueva after a two-year manhunt for allegedly using his position to facilitate drug
shipments and money laundering in the far southeastern state of Quintana Roo; (2)
the arrest in June 2001 of cell leader Ramon Alcides Magana who was transshipping
cocaine through Quintana Roo with tacit support from Governor Villanueva; (3) the
arrest in May 2002 of Jesus Albino Quintero Meraz, a top lieutenant in the Gulf
Cartel who had also worked for former Governor Mario Villanueva; (4) the arrest in
April 2003 of Arturo Hernandez, a senior hit man responsible for the deaths of many
persons including the plastic surgery doctors whose bungled efforts led to the death
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in July 1997 of cartel boss Amado Carrillo Fuentes; (5) and the arrests in August and
September 2003 of major CFO traffickers Jose Laija Serron and Rigoberto Glaxiola.
In a related development, in July 2003, during “Operation Trifecta,” Mexican
authorities arrested three major drug traffickers, including Manuel Medina Campas,
a leading lieutenant of the Ismael Zambada Garcia Organization that spun off from
the CFO.
Achievements  against the Osiel Cardenas-Guillen Organization (or Gulf Cartel,
formerly led by the now-imprisoned Juan Garcia-Abrego) include (1) the arrests in
April 2001 and March 2002 of traffickers Gilberto Garcia Mena and Adan Medrano;
(2) the arrest in March 2003 of prime cartel leader Osiel Cardenas-Guillen; and (3)
the arrests in August 2004 of major cartel figures Ramiro Hernández and Gilberto
Higuera Guerrero. 
Successes against the Caro-Quintero Organization include the arrest in
December 2001 of cartel leader Miguel Caro Quintero.
Accomplishments against the Armando Valencia-Cornelio Organization (or
Milenio Cartel) that operates primarily in the states of Jalisco and Michoacan include
the arrest in August 2003 in Guadalajara of cartel leader Armando Valencia-Cornelio
and seven associates.  
Other achievements include the arrest in May 2001 of Adan Amezcua of the
Amezcua-Contreras methamphetamine trafficking organization.
Extraditions.  The Mexican government extradited a record total of 31 persons
to the United States in 2003 (including 18 Mexican nationals and 19 narcotics
defendants), compared to 25 in 2002, and 17 in 2001, under the Fox Administration,
and 12 by the Zedillo Administration in 2000.  In addition, over 70 fugitives who
were in Mexico illegally were expelled to the United States.  Denials of U.S.
extradition requests fell from 25 in 2002 (including 3 high profile cases) to 10 in
2003, and Mexican domestic prosecution of fugitives from foreign jurisdictions
increased, with 178 convictions out of 194 such prosecutions from 2001 to 2003.9 
Until the last few years, Mexican policy and court decisions required that
Mexican nationals wanted for crimes committed abroad be prosecuted in Mexico.
However, the Zedillo Administration  broke new ground by extraditing seven
Mexican nationals and one dual U.S.-Mexican national to the United States between
1996 and 2000 on grounds that this was permitted under the U.S.-Mexico extradition
treaty and Mexican extradition law in exceptional cases.  Despite this stance,
Mexican courts continued to be reluctant to approve extradition of Mexican
nationals, even when recommended by the Mexican Foreign Ministry, and they freed
several alleged drug traffickers after raising questions about the constitutionality and
appropriateness of  extraditions, especially where capital punishment or life sentences
might be applied. 
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In January 2001, the Mexican Supreme Court ruled that Mexican citizens may
be extradited to the United States for prosecution on drug charges provided that they
are sentenced under Mexican guidelines.  This seemed to clear one legal hurdle, but
the INCSR report in 2001 noted that adverse lower court decisions on other issues,
particularly the question of life imprisonment and capital punishment, continued to
impede the extradition process.10  In October 2001, the Mexican Supreme Court ruled
that life imprisonment is unconstitutional in Mexico and a bar to extradition for
fugitives facing that penalty in another country, although extradition may take place
if the requesting country provides assurances that this penalty will not be imposed.
The INCSR report in 2002 characterized this decision as a significant setback, with
the potential to frustrate the extradition of the most serious criminals.  It also
expressed concern about overly technical legalistic analysis of extradition requests.11
The INCSR report in 2004 noted that the two governments were working hard to
narrow the impact of the October 2001 decision and to eliminate the backlog of
extradition requests, and that the Foreign Ministry was asserting its prerogative to
judge the adequacy of U.S. assurances.12
Temporary Surrender Protocol.  The Mexican Senate in December 2000
approved a protocol to the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty, already approved by the
U.S. Senate, that would permit the temporary surrender for trial of fugitives who are
serving sentences in one country but are also wanted on criminal charges in the other
country.  Following the meeting of Presidents Bush and Fox in Mexico in mid-
February 2001, officials worked to implement this temporary surrender protocol, and
the protocol entered into force in May 2001.  According to the INCSR covering 2003,
Mexican authorities have reported legal difficulties in implementing the Protocol.
Anti-Corruption Efforts.  As the first president to be elected from an
opposition party in 71 years, President Fox has promised to strengthen democracy
and the rule of law in Mexico, and to fight corruption and crime.  He has proposed
the professionalization of the police under a new Public Security Ministry to deal
with widespread public concerns with security and police corruption.  As part of
those efforts his Administration has reorganized the Attorney General’s office (PGR),
reformed the Federal Judicial Police (PJF), and created a new Federal Investigative
Agency (AFI) patterned after the FBI to some extent.  
Following the escape from prison of drug lord Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman,
President Fox announced a national crusade against drug trafficking on January 24,
2001, promising to eliminate corruption in the police and prison systems and to
enhance law enforcement efforts against drug traffickers.  After that, a large number
of the prison officials in the state of Jalisco were questioned and charged, and many
customs officials and anti-drug agents in the state of Chihuahua were removed from
office.  In early November 2002, President Fox presented a tougher, more
comprehensive, six-year National Drug Control Plan, which recognized Mexico’s
growing drug problem and the need for greater cooperation among agencies, while
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noting Mexican successes against major drug traffickers.  At a broader level,
President Fox has ordered the Secretariat of Public Administration (SFP) to
aggressively attack official corruption.  He also proposed and is implementing a
Freedom of Information law that went into effect in July 2003 to encourage honesty
and transparency.  
Notable efforts to punish drug-related corruption include the arrest in January
2001 of prison officials who facilitated the escape of drug lord Joaquin Guzman; the
arrest in February 2001 of state and local police in Mexicali who had blocked official
efforts to capture AFO lieutenant Gilberto Higuera Guerrero; the arrest in April 2001
of a brigadier general and two other officers for complicity with the Gulf Cartel; the
arrests in Tecate in April 2002 of more than 40 high-level law enforcement officials
with ties to AFO traffickers; the arrest in October 2002 of 25 mid-level officials on
suspicion of disclosing sensitive information to drug traffickers; the implementation
throughout 2002 of policies to force the retirement of all personnel in the Federal
Judicial Police; the seizure in January 2003 of 17 offices of the elite federal anti-drug
unit known as FEADS and disbandment following the discovery of evidence that it
was being corrupted by drug traffickers; and the arrest in late January 2004 of a
number of Mexican state police officers in the border state of Chihuahua on
suspicion of involvement with drug traffickers in the killing of 11 men from rival
drug gangs.
At a more systematic level, the government maintains a national police registry
to prevent reemployment of corrupt policeman, and the Attorney General’s office has
greatly expanded the screening and vetting of employees, especially for the formation
of the Sensitive Investigations Units (SIUs) dealing with extremely sensitive
information.  According to the INCSR reports, the Attorney General’s office
dismissed 1,100 people for irregularities in 2001 of some 14,000 screened
employees, while the anti-corruption agency took action against over 4,400
employees in 2002, and imposed over 2,500 sanctions in the first half of 2003.13  
Eradication of Illicit Crops
Table 3 portrays the results of Mexican efforts to eradicate opium poppy and
marijuana cultivation in the last six years, showing the total area of cultivation, the
total eradication effort regardless of the number of sprayings, the effective
eradication area. the potential area available for harvest and production, and the
potential yield of the illicit products.
The results for eradication are somewhat surprising, in part because the total
area under cultivation and the potential harvest area has been expanding
considerably, in part because of favorable growing conditions, so that even where
there are increases in the number of hectares eradicated, there may still be increases
in the potential yield of the product. 
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Table 3. Mexican Eradication of Illicit Drugs, 1998-2003
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Opium
  Cultivation (ha)
  Total Eradication (ha)
  Effective Eradication (ha)
  Potential Harvest (ha)
































  Cultivation (ha)
  Total Eradication (ha)
  Effective Eradication (ha)
  Potential Harvest (ha)































Sources: Data are from the U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March
2004, Part I, pp. 159-168, especially the Table on page 168, with corrected and updated data from the State
Department in October 2004.  Cultivation and Eradication are measured in hectares (ha), with one hectare
equaling 2.47 acres.  Cultivation represents the number of hectares in which the crops are grown.  Total
eradication reflects the total hectares sprayed, including spraying a field three times if there are three crops, and
is a good representation of Mexican efforts.  Effective eradication reflects the U.S. estimates of the number of
hectares eradicated, factoring out repeated spraying in one area and is one factor in calculating potential yield.
Potential harvest is the resulting number of hectares available for harvesting and production.  Potential yield
reflects the metric tons (mt) of the illicit drug that could have been produced given the available hectares of the
product.
The U.S. estimate of total eradication of opium poppy cultivation in 2003 of
20,000 hectares is 2% above the figure for 2002, and 15% above the average of
16,964 hectares in the 1998-2002 period.  The effective eradication of opium poppy
cultivation in 2003 of 10,100 hectares was 6% below the performance in 2000, and
8% below the average effective eradication in the 1998-2002 period.  However, with
the increase in the total area under cultivation and the better growing conditions, the
estimated potential harvest was 4,800 hectares, which produced a potential yield in
2003 of 101 metric tons of opium gum, a significant 74% increase from the potential
yield of 58 in 2002, and a 45% increase over the average of 75 metric tons in 1998-
2002.14  The Mexican State of the Nation report provides data only on the total area
of eradication, showing a 39% increase from 12,302 hectares of opium poppy
eradicated in the first six months of 2003 to 17,062 eradicated in the first six months
of 2004. 
The U.S. estimate of total eradication of marijuana in 2003 was 36,600 hectares,
a 19% increase over 2002, and a 21% increase over the average of 30,120 hectares
in the 1998-2002 years.  The estimate of effective eradication of Mexican marijuana
in 2003 was 20,800 hectares, a 39% increase over 2002, and a 44% increase over the
1998-2002 average of 14,240.  With a potential harvest of 7,500 hectares, the
potential yield of 13,500 metric tons of marijuana in 2003 was up 71% from 2002,
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and up 76% from the average of 7,460 for the 1998-2002 period.  The Mexican State
of the Nation report provides data only on the total area of eradication, showing a
72% increase from 110,008 hectares of marijuana eradicated in January-June 2003
to 17,209 hectares eradicated in January-June 2004.
In short, while eradication efforts expanded in 2003, compared to previous
years, the estimated yield of opium poppy gum in Mexico increased 74%, while the
estimated yield of marijuana in Mexico increased 71%, significant increases for both
illicit products.  More recent Mexican data show continuing increases in the area of
poppy and marijuana eradicated.
Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Cooperation 
with the United States
U.S.-Mexico counter-narcotics cooperation increased substantially during the
Administration of President Zedillo (1994-2000), with the full range of law
enforcement, military, and border and drug control agencies being involved.  Acting
through the annual cabinet-level meetings of the Binational Commission, the twice
yearly High Level Contact Group (HLCG) on Drug Control, and the roughly
quarterly Mexico-U.S. Senior Law Enforcement Plenary, the countries’ leaders
agreed on a joint anti-drug strategy with numerous cooperative arrangements.15 
Following the inaugurations of new presidents in the United States and Mexico,
President Bush, on his first foreign visit, met with President Fox in Guanajuato,
Mexico, in mid-February 2001, and the two leaders pledged to pursue a “partnership
for prosperity.”  On drug trafficking issues, they agreed to strengthen law
enforcement cooperation in accordance with each country’s national jurisdiction, and
in the joint press conference, President Bush indicated that he had confidence in
President Fox’s efforts to control corruption and drug trafficking in Mexico, and that
there was a movement in Congress to reform the U.S. drug certification procedure
which Mexico considered unfriendly.  With legislation unfinished, on March 1, 2001,
President Bush certified that Mexico had cooperated fully with U.S. counter-
narcotics efforts, citing arrests of drug traffickers and impressive eradication results
in 2000
During President Fox’s official state visit to the United States on September 5-7,
2001, the Mexican President, in addressing a joint session of Congress, called upon
legislators to pass legislation to suspend the drug certification requirements as a
gesture of trust and faith in the new government, arguing that “trust requires that one
partner not be judged unilaterally by the other.”  Following the Bush-Fox talks, the
joint communique praised the growing law enforcement cooperation between the
countries, expressed support for the OAS’ multilateral evaluation of counter-
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narcotics efforts, and noted President Bush’s commitment “to work with the U.S.
Congress, on a priority basis, to replace the annual counter-narcotics certification
regime with new measures designed to enhance international cooperation in this
area.”
Earlier, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out S. 219 (a bill to
modify drug certification requirements) in April 2001, and then reported out S. 1401
(Foreign Relations Authorization for FY2002-FY2003), with similar language in
Sections 741-745, in August 2001.  These provisions would modify the drug
certification process for three years, require designation of the countries subject to
sanctions only, and encourage development of a multilateral strategy.  Lacking
congressional action on S. 219 or S. 1401, the drug certification requirements were
temporarily modified in late 2001 by enactment of the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act for FY2002 (H.R. 2506/P.L. 107-115).  This measure waived the
drug certification requirements for FY2002 and required the President to designate
only countries that had demonstrably failed to meet international counter-narcotics
obligations.16 
During the Bush-Fox meeting in Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002, the
Presidents acknowledged “major successes achieved by Mexico in the fight against
narco-trafficking”  and agreed on “the importance of redoubling judicial cooperation”
between the countries.  The March 2002 INSCR report on Mexico noted that the two
countries cooperated in a range of bilateral counter-narcotics and law enforcement
fora, including the Legal Working Group of the Binational Commission, and the
Senior Law Enforcement Plenary Group. It emphasized that the climate of
cooperation within the bilateral law enforcement and military communities had
improved dramatically in recent years, stating that “For the first time in recent
memory, both sides are sharing sensitive information on counternarcotics issues.”
The report mentioned bilateral air-to-air communications on interdiction operations,
joint post-seizure analysis of maritime operations, and bilateral military intelligence
sharing.  It noted that U.S.-sponsored law enforcement training tripled in 2001, and
that military-to-military contacts increased, with ion scanner and night vision goggle
training being especially useful in Mexico’s drug interdiction efforts.  Among the
joint operations that might be cited to exemplify the close cooperation between the
countries is Operation Marquis, which culminated in June 2001 with the arrest of
about 80 individuals in the United States and Mexico.17
In this cooperative bilateral environment, in September 2002, the Congress and
President enacted the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2003 (H.R.
1646/P.L. 107-228) that, in Section 706, made permanent a requirement that the
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President designate in mid-September of each year, before the beginning of the fiscal
year, the countries which have demonstrably failed to meet international counter-
narcotics obligations, thereby removing an irritant in the bilateral relationship.
According to the INCSR covering 2002 and 2003, the cooperation between the
countries has continued along the same trajectory.  Both reports state that “the United
States and Mexico achieved unprecedented levels of cooperation in fighting drug
trafficking and other transnational crimes.”  The report covering 2003 went on to say
that “U.S. and Mexican law enforcement personnel routinely share sensitive
information to aid in the capture and prosecution of drug traffickers and the seizure
of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine shipments.”18  The reports
mentioned the  continuing dialogue between officials of the countries through the
annual Binational Commission meetings, the twice yearly Senior Law Enforcement
Plenary (SLEP) meetings, and the Bilateral Interdiction Working Group (BIWG)
meetings, with each forum having various sub-groups working on relevant issues. 
The reports mentioned the continuing professionalization of the law
enforcement and military institutions, and indicated the prominent role of the United
States in these efforts.  In 2003, the United States sponsored over 140 training
courses for 6,484 Mexican police officers, prosecutors and investigators.  In 2002,
it provided  computer equipment and software to the Office of the Attorney General
(PGR) and the Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) and the National Center for
Analysis, Planning and Intelligence (CENAPI).  During FY2002, over 200 Mexican
military members received U.S.-sponsored military training, and Mexican liaison
officers participated on some U.S. vessels and task forces.  In activities with counter-
narcotics and counter-terrorism implications, U.S. and Mexican officials are
installing Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment (NIIE) at border crossing points,
establishing Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) to review commercial
airline passenger lists, training to rescue migrants stranded in remote desert regions,
and deploying software to plan for infrastructure and staffing needs at ports of entry.
In the end, the results of United States and Mexican efforts are mixed.  Despite
the unprecedented levels of cooperation between the United States and Mexico and
the major Mexican strides against the leading drug trafficking organizations, Mexico
continues to be the principal transit country for South American cocaine entering the
United States, the leading foreign source of marijuana, and a principal source of
heroin.  Despite impressive eradication efforts, the estimated production in Mexico
of opium poppy gum and marijuana increased significantly in the last year for which
reporting is complete. 
